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If consumers wholly or partially control a rm with market power they will
charge less than the prot maximizing price. Starting at the usual monopoly
price, a small price reduction will have a second order e¤ect on prots but a
rst order e¤ect on consumer surplus. Despite this desirable static result, it has
been argued that cooperatives are vulnerable to take-over by outsiders who will
run them as for-prot businesses. This paper studies takeovers of cooperatives.
We argue that there will not be excessive takeovers of cooperatives due to the
Grossman-Hart problem of free riding during takeovers.
Address for Correspondence David Kelsey, Department of Economics,
University of Exeter, Rennes Drive, Exeter, Devon, EX4 4PU, ENGLAND.
Keywords, corporate governance, cooperative, take-over, free-rider, external-
ity.
JEL Classication: D70, L20.
Research in part supported by ESRC grant RES-000-22-0650. We would like to thank the




In many cases production is not organized in conventional for-prot joint stock com-
panies. The alternatives include worker and consumer cooperatives, partnerships, not
for prot rms and even joint stock companies where the shares are owned by trading
partners. Moreover smaller limited companies often deviate from the textbook model
of prot maximization. These di¤erences between types of organization do not ap-
pear random (for instance driven by political tastes) but instead are systematically
related to the type of industry in which rms operate. Moreover these organizations
seem relatively stable and persist over long periods of time.
Cooperatives have been shown to have desirable static properties, since they can
often reduce market distortions such as those due to monopoly or externalities, see
for instance, Hart and Moore (1996), Roemer (1993) or Renstrom and Yalcin (2003).
However it is often argued that cooperatives have unsatisfactory dynamic performance
since they do not have the correct incentives for investment and are vulnerable to take-
over by an outsider who aims to convert them into prot maximizing rms, see Farrell
(1985). The present paper takes up the second issue and argues that cooperatives
may be less vulnerable to the threat of take-over than previously believed.
Hansmann (1996) cites a number of examples where rms are owned by those who
trade with them either on input or output markets. He argues that, in many cases, this
is to counter monopoly or monopsony power. This practice is very common among
rms, which supply inputs to or buy produce from farms. Refsell (1914) explains in
detail how cooperative grain elevators came to dominate the mid-west. Their share
of the industry expanded rapidly at the expense of for-prot rivals during the period
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1903-1913. It is clear from his account that the main reason for this was a response
to monopoly pricing by for-prot grain elevators. In relatively remote rural areas, it
is easier to establish a local monopoly. This is not an isolated example. Cooperatives
supply inputs to farms and purchase their produce in many countries. Some of them
have forward integrated into processing distribution and marketing and as a result
have become quite large organizations. A number of well-known brand names have
been developed by farmerscooperatives such as Welchs, Sun-Maid and Sun Kist.1
The reason that such organizations come into existence and thrive is that in
relatively remote rural areas competition is not possible due to the small scale of
the market. If these businesses were organized on a for-prot basis they would have
monopoly power. Farm cooperatives (at least partially) internalize the distortion and
thus bring about an improvement in allocative e¢ ciency. For similar reasons many
professional services, such as lawyers and accountants, are provided by partnerships.
A possible explanation is that the rm is a monopoly supplier of inputs such as client
lists, which these people need to work. Partnerships reduce the distortion in prices.
Viewed this way a legal partnership has some features in common with an agricultural
cooperative.
1.2 Monopoly Power and Cooperatives
This paper is related to the general equilibrium literature on imperfect competition,
see for instance Gabszewicz and Vial (1972). In general equilibrium with imperfect
competition the Fisher Separation Theorem breaks down. Shareholders will typically
not wish the rm to maximize prots.2 This is because with imperfect competition the
rms decisions will, in general, a¤ect prices throughout the economy. Shareholders
1For further details see Hansmann (1996) Ch. 7.
2See especially Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) p395.
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will be a¤ected by the rms decisions both because their incomes depend on prots
and because the rm can directly a¤ect the prices they face. In general the second
e¤ect is non zero hence they will not wish to maximize prot but also take account
of the rms impact on prices. In such circumstances a prot maximizing rm may
yield lower utility to shareholder/consumers than another form of organization.
These arguments show that consumer ownership of monopolies may be benecial,
see, Demichelis and Ritzberger (2006), Farrell (1985) and Kelsey and Milne (2008). In
circumstances where competition is not possible, monopoly distortions are reduced
without government intervention. Consider a rm that is the sole producer of a
particular good. Suppose that consumers have a substantial inuence over its pricing
and output decisions. It is in the interest of consumer-shareholders to set the price
below the monopoly level, since a small price reduction will result in a second order
loss of prots but a rst order gain in their consumer surplus. If a rm faces input
markets which are imperfectly competitive, then a similar argument establishes it
may be desirable to give input suppliers inuence in decisions.
A number of di¤erent legal arrangements may serve to give consumers and/or
suppliers inuence in decision-making. If the input concerned is a form of labour,
the rm could be a worker cooperative or a partnership. Professional partnerships
serve to supply only those kinds of labour for which there is a market distortion,
while other kinds of labour can be hired on a standard wage contract. Consumer
cooperatives would serve to control monopoly power in output markets. Alternatively
the interested parties could hold blocks of shares in a limited liability company.3
3The latter possibility is discussed in more detail in section 3.3.
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1.3 Stability of Cooperatives
Despite the desirable static properties of consumer ownership it has been argued that
such a rm will not be stable in the long-run. For instance, Farrell (1985) argues that
consumer-controlled monopolies may be vulnerable to takeover.4 To understand his
argument, consider a consumer-owned monopoly, which is selling below the prot-
maximising price. Farrell argues that a raider (who is not a consumer) could buy
up shares at the current value and then make a prot by increasing the product
price, thereby increasing the value of his/her shares. This will reduce the utility
of a majority of the members of the cooperative. Although they sell their shares
at a premium, the subsequent price rise will reduce their consumer surplus. It is
possible that a member who only makes small purchases of the rms output will
gain. However total surplus is reduced since, aggregated over all ex-ante members of
the cooperative, the losses out-weight the gains. There is, in addition, a redistribution
of wealth from the members of the cooperative to the raider. Thus there is a strong
presumption that social welfare is reduced.
The members of the cooperative will typically be worse o¤ if the takeover succeeds,
however Farrell argues that they will accept the raiders o¤er because the output price
is a public good for shareholders. As usual, free-rider problems imply that they will
not internalize the benets to others of a low price and hence will accept the o¤er.
Corneo (1997) argues that the because of the vulnerability of cooperatives to
takeover, a publicly owned rm might be superior. In his model there is a pub-
licly owned rm with increasing returns to scale. Corneo assumes that prices are
determined by the median voter. This could be the result ether of direct or indirect
democracy. In this context, marginal cost pricing is (rst-best) e¢ cient but will result
4See also Dow and Skillman (2007).
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in losses, which need to be nanced through general taxation. For similar reasons
to that already discussed in the context of cooperatives, the median voter rule will
result in a price below the prot maximizing monopoly level. However majority vot-
ing will only result in marginal cost pricing if the mean and median voter have the
same preferences. Our result says that if the median voter gets less benet from the
cooperative than the mean voter it is protable for the raider to buy up the shares
of the 50% of the members who get least benet from the cooperative and convert it
into a prot maximizing rm. For a public rm takeovers are not possible. However
the protection a¤orded by public ownership is not absolute since there is always the
possibility of privatization. If the median taxpayer received less benet from public
ownership than the mean taxpayer then there may be political pressure to privatize
the rm.5 In other words these arguments suggest that privatization is more likely
for publicly owned rms which tend to benet better o¤ tax-payers.
Although Farrells argument that cooperatives are vulnerable to takeover is log-
ically correct, it does not appear to be supported by the evidence. Cooperatives,
partnerships and similar organizations have dominated many lines of business over
long periods of time. Thus it does not always seem to be the case that cooperatives
are unstable. Nor is it necessarily true that for-prot rms tend to take over an
industry. As noted above, in the twentieth century cooperatives took over much of
the trade with farms in rural areas in the USA and a number of other countries.
There have been some instances where cooperatives have been restructured as for
prot businesses. However often these appear to be driven by changes in regulation
and/or tax law, not any intrinsic instability of cooperatives. For instance, in the
recent past in the UK and Australia, building societies (mutual banks) have been
5Corneo (1997) assumes preferences are quasi linear, which implies rich individuals have the same
demand as the less well-o¤. This comment applies to a possible extension of his model where this
assumption is relaxed.
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replaced by for-prot banks. This change occurred because the building societies lost
a long standing tax advantage. Overall we believe that these industry structures do
not appear to be as unstable as Farrells argument suggests.
Hansmann (1996) shows that mutual banks and insurance companies gained busi-
ness at the expense of for prot rivals in the nineteenth century. He argues that this
was because they had superior monitoring abilities, which enabled them to control
moral hazard. In particular the nature of the deposit contract meant that for-prot
banks have an incentive to make excessively risky investments. If successful, the
bank owners take all the gains, while depositors bear the bulk of the losses if the
investments fail. In a mutual bank, which could be a trust or a cooperative of de-
positors, there is no residual claimant. Thus the potential gains from risk-taking are
reduced. Mutual banks also had superior abilities to control moral hazard by bor-
rowers. Throughout the twentieth century increased regulation reduced the scope for
moral hazard. In particular widespread deposit insurance gave savers less reason to
prefer mutual banks. As result they became less common.6
1.4 Takeovers of Cooperatives
In the present paper we study takeovers of cooperatives. The model is based on a two-
stage game between a raider and the members of the cooperative. In the rst stage,
the raider decides whether to make an o¤er for the membersshares and how much
to bid. Secondly the members simultaneously decide whether or not to accept the
o¤er. We show that raider can only take over the rm if (s)he can increase its value
by more than the benet the median shareholder gets from the cooperative. If the
6This regulation was partly counter-productive. Mutual savings and loans had a signicantly
lower default rate during the US savings and loans crisis of the 1980s. Despite this they were
charged the same premiums for deposit insurance as for-prot rivals.
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median and mean members have the same preferences this implies that takeovers will
only occur if they maximize total surplus. Or equivalently takeovers can only cause
ine¢ ciency when the preferences of the median and the mean member are di¤erent.
We also study a sequential model which demonstrates that our results are reasonably
robust in the sense that they do not depend crucially on the sequence of moves.
Suppose in the initial situation the cooperative chooses its price to maximize the
total surplus of its members. This will involve pricing below the monopoly level. Let
o denote the value of the shares in the initial situation. If the rm raised prices to
the prot maximizing level, then the value of its shares would increase to 1 > o:
Consider the possibility that a raider o¤ers to buy the shares at price q, per share,
and increase the value by reorganising the former cooperative as a prot maximizing
rm. For the raider to be able to make a prot it is necessary that 1 > q > o.
Farrell (1985) identies the following problem: if each member of a large cooper-
ative decides individually whether or not to accept the raiders o¤er, then any given
member will prefer a small premium over the current market price and (s)he will see
the success or failure of the takeover as independent of his/her own decision, (i.e.
an individual does not take into account that his/her decision might be pivotal to
turn a failure of the takeover into a success) and might eliminate the total benet to
members of being able to buy the good at a low price.
In the present paper we identify a similar e¤ect which gives an individual member
an incentive to reject the o¤er. Suppose that a given member does not take into
account the possibility that his/her decision may a¤ect the success or failure of the
takeover. The given member will prefer to reject the o¤er and wait to get the post-
takeover price 1 rather than accept the o¤er now and receive q < 1: In other words
the given member does not take into account the possibility that his/her decision
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might be crucial for the success or failure of the takeover. The second e¤ect is similar
to the free-riding problem identied by Grossman and Hart (1980).
Organization of the paper The next section contains our main model of takeovers.
Section 2.4 discusses some limitations of the model in particular the assumption that
information is symmetric. Our conclusions can be found in section 3, which discusses
how our analysis may be extended from imperfect competition to other market dis-
tortions. The appendix contains the statements and proofs of some technical lemmas
used to establish the main results.
2 TAKEOVERS
We consider a rm, which is the sole producer of a good or service. Suppose the
rm is initially organized as a cooperative, we show that provided the preferences of
the members are not too diverse, it is not a protable strategy to take it over and
reorganize it as a prot-maximizing rm.
In addition to cooperatives we wish to study other situations where production
is undertaken by organizations which are not conventional for-prot joint stock com-
panies. It is impractical to model all of the possible cases in detail. Instead we have
focused on one central case. The key assumptions are that shares can be traded and
that once the raider has the support of a majority of shares he can take control.
These are chosen because they are, if anything, favourable to the raider. Even in this
case, we nd that there is no reason to believe that the number of takeovers will be




Consider a cooperative of M individuals or members, 1 6 i 6 M: For simplicity





Thus a group of individuals has a majority if and only if it contains at least m
members.
In the initial situation, assume that individual i gets benets 0 + di; from shares
in the rm. Here 0 denotes the current value of the rms prots and di denotes the
value of being able to purchase the good below the monopoly price. These benets
are experienced, whether or not the individual owns shares in the rm.7 We assume
that the individuals are numbered so that d1 < d2 < ::: < dM : Apart from ruling out
indi¤erence, this is without loss of generality. Assume that decisions are made by
majority rule, so a change will be introduced if at least half the members approve.
We consider the following model of a takeover attempt. First a raider decides
whether or not to o¤er to purchase the shares from members at price q: Then the
existing shareholders decide simultaneously and independently whether or not to
accept. If the raider is successful, (s)he will increase prots to 1 > o by raising
price.
Suppose a raider o¤ers to takeover the rm at a price of q per share. Let i denote
a given member of the cooperative. Initially (s)he receives benet 0 + di: Assume
(s)he accepts the o¤er and the takeover fails, then (s)he can continue to receive the
benet di; hence his/her payo¤ is q + di: On the other hand if the takeover succeeds,
the raider will adopt prot-maximizing policies and eliminate the benet di; thus is
7In these circumstances it may be protable for the rm to practice price discrimination and
sell at di¤erent prices to shareholders and non-shareholders. In an earlier paper, Kelsey and Milne
(2006), we have investigated the implications of price discrimination in a related model. Here we
simply assume that price discrimination is impossible either due to legislation or because consumers
can resell.
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payo¤ will be q: If i rejects the o¤er and the takeover fails his/her payo¤ will be
unchanged at 0 + di: When the takeover succeeds the private benet is eliminated,
however the value of the shares will increase, thus is payo¤ is 1: The following table
summarizes the pay-o¤ of individual i in the various possible outcomes.8
takeover succeeds takeover fails
i accepts q q + di
i rejects 1 0 + di
The following result says that a successful takeover is possible if and only if the
amount by which the raider can increase the value of the rm is greater than the ben-
et which the median shareholder gets from the controlling the monopoly distortion.
Proposition 2.1 A necessary and su¢ cient condition for the existence of a subgame
perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, in which the raider succeeds in taking over the
rm is: 1   o > dm:




i=1 di denote the average (i.e. mean) benet to a cooperative member.
Proposition 2.2 If d > dm (resp. d < dm) then too many (resp., too few) takeovers
occur in equilibrium. If d = dm; then the equilibrium is e¢ cient, in the sense that
takeovers occur if and only if they increase total surplus.
Proof. Takeovers are e¢ cient if n (1   o) >
PM
i=1 di or 1   o > d: Thus only if
d = dm is the equilibrium e¢ cient.
If d = dm; takeovers will occur if and only if they increase total surplus. Say that
a cooperative is internally e¢ cient if the level of externalities (direct or pecuniary) it
8Note that whether or not the takeover succeeds may depend upon individual is decision. Thus
takeover succeedsand takeover failsare not states in the sense of Savage (1954).
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provides for its members satises the Samuleson condition for public goods. There is
a related result by Bowen (1943) who shows that if the median voter and the mean
voter have the same preferences then majority voting will result in e¢ cient provision
of public goods. Together the two results imply that a cooperative which is internally
e¢ cient, can only be taken over when it is socially desirable in the sense that the
raider increases the total surplus.
So far we have assumed that the di are exogenous. However in practice these
parameters can often be inuenced by the design of the constitution of the cooperative
and selection of members. Hansmann (1996) argues that cooperatives are careful to
ensure that the preferences of their members are relatively similar. For instance in
agricultural cooperatives members are given voting rights in proportion to their trade
with the cooperative. As far as possible the rm should use its inuence to ensure
the preferences of the mean and median voter are similar. If the rm can ensure that
d = dm then takeovers occur if and only if they are e¢ cient.
There is a potential distortion within cooperatives. If decisions are made by a
majority vote, the outcome will coincide with the preference of the median voter.
However the cost will be born by the mean voter. If the median and mean voter
have very di¤erent preferences then it is possible that the median voter will use the
cooperative to make implicit transfers from the mean voter to himself/herself. If such
distortions occur, the cooperative is unlikely to be e¢ cient.
2.2 Sequential O¤ers
We believe that our argument is reasonably robust and does not depend crucially on
the details of the interaction between the raider and the cooperative. As an alternative
consider the possibility that the raider approached the members sequentially rather
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than simultaneously. This situation could be modelled as an n+ 1 stage game. First
the raider quotes a price q at which (s)he is prepared to buy shares. Then each
shareholder in turn decides whether or not to accept the o¤er, i.e. rst individual 1
decides then individual 2 decides,..., nally individual M decides. There is complete
and perfect information.
The next result studies the equilibrium of the sequential model. We nd that the
necessary and su¢ cient condition for the takeover to succeed is the same as in the
simultaneous model.
Proposition 2.3 In the sequential model of takeovers, a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, in
which the raider succeeds in taking over the rm is: 1   o > dm:
The e¢ ciency properties of the sequential takeover model are similar to those
of the simultaneous move model. This follows since the necessary and su¢ cient
condition for a successful takeover is the same in both cases.
2.3 Constitutions for Cooperatives
In those cases where the takeover fails, the raider does not succeed for the reasons
identied in Grossman and Hart (1980). The existing shareholders free-ride on the
price of shares. By not accepting the o¤er, shareholders benet from the increase in
price without contributing to the costs of the takeover. Grossman and Hart argue that
rms have incentives to overcome the free-rider problem by adopting constitutions,
which allow raiders to either compulsorily purchase minority shares or dilute the
rights of minority shareholders. Alternatively it may be desirable for government to
introduce legislation allowing compulsory purchase of minority shares (as in the UK).
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In the present context, the raiders behaviour is undesirable to existing cooperative
members and probably society in general. It is in the interest of the cooperative to
introduce a constitution, which gives strong protection to minority rights. This will
make free-riding easier and consequently reduce the chances of a hostile takeover.
Hansmann (1996) shows that most consumer cooperatives allocate voting rights in
proportion to the fraction of the output purchased. This would be one way to protect
against takeovers. It is worth noting that most governments o¤er separate laws
dealing with cooperatives and business rms. Protection against takeover may be
more desirable for cooperatives.
In practice, cooperatives do not act naively when faced with strategic players.
Refsell (1914) documents how cooperative grain elevators were established in the
mid-west despite a number of attempts by a cartel of grain dealers to prevent them.
Both sides were clearly acting strategically. For instance, the for prot rms tried to
organize boycotts to prevent the wholesalers in Chicago from dealing with coopera-
tives. In practice, shares in cooperatives are not freely traded. Members are often
required to sell their shares back to the cooperative if they wish to leave. Decisions
are made on the basis of one member one votenot one share one vote. Hence a
potential raider would have to convince a majority of members not the holders of a
majority of shares that (s)he was o¤ering a good deal. These various legal restric-
tions make it harder to takeover a cooperative than is implied by our assumptions.




This section considers some alternative assumptions and discusses how they would
a¤ect our conclusions. In particular we consider asymmetric information, the possibil-
ity that it takes more than a simple majority to turn the cooperative into a for-prot
rm or that non-members benet from externalities created by the cooperative.
Firstly we have used a model with symmetric information. It is di¢ cult to give
precise predictions about the e¤ects of asymmetric information since there are many
possible kinds of informational asymmetries. Generally the literature on informa-
tion economics, shows that an agent with an informational disadvantage will ceteris
paribus make lower prot. It seems most likely that the raider will have an infor-
mational disadvantage, in which case takeovers will be more di¢ cult than in the
symmetric information model.
Another implication of the absence of informational asymmetries is that members
of the cooperative know whether or not their votes are pivotal. As a result pivotal
voters reject the take-over, while non pivotal voters vote in favour. The e¤ects of
incomplete information are ambiguous. It is possible that some pivotal voters might
not realise that they are pivotal and hence vote for the takeover when this is not
actually in their interests. However it is equally possible that non-pivotal voters
might vote against the takeover because of the possibility that they might be pivotal.
In practice, cooperatives may need a super-majority vote to sell the rm to an
outsider, (i.e. it might require a two thirds or 75% majority to approve the sale). We
believe that the issues raised in this paper are one of the main reasons that such rules
are used. Often shares in cooperatives are not openly traded. Both possibilities tend
to make takeovers even more di¢ cult. This would tend to strengthen our conclusion
that ine¢ cient takeovers are unlikely to occur in equilibrium. However super-majority
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rules would have the e¤ect of preventing some takeovers which increase social surplus.
It is possible that the cooperative generates externalities (either direct or pecu-
niary) for some nonmembers. For small group externalities, e.g. a group of farmers
running a cooperative grain elevator or a professional partnership using a common
client list, it is practical to include all or nearly all beneciaries. For a rm which pro-
duced more widespread externalities (e.g. a rm such as Microsoft with global market
power) it is almost inevitable that many nonmembers will also benet. This would
result in the rm producing a positive externality. For the usual reasons this external-
ity would be under-produced in equilibrium. In particular too many takeovers would
succeed in equilibrium. (Assuming the social objective is maximizing total surplus.)
This problem would not arise if the cooperative either refuses to trade with nonmem-
bers or charges non-members commercial prices. Both practices are not uncommon.
(Even some for-prot companies practice price discrimination between shareholders
and others.)
Our results would need to be modied if the raider received private benets of
control from a successful takeover. In this case (s)he can a¤ord to pay more than the
maximised prot per share, which will increase his/her chances of success. However
note that the private benet makes the reduction in total surplus from a takeover
smaller than it would be otherwise. Indeed if the private benet is greater than the
total surplus in the initial situation then such a takeover would be e¢ cient. On the
other hand if the current cooperative members receive non-monetary benets from
the status quo this will mean the raider has to make a higher o¤er for the takeover
to succeed. Hence takeovers will be less likely. Similarly if the rm were in a line
of business in which for-prot rms were intrinsically more e¢ cient then takeovers
would be more likely than our analysis suggests. However as Hansmann (1996) argues
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there are many circumstances in which a cooperative form is more e¢ cient, which
would tend to reduce the raiders chances of success.
Although our model is somewhat stylized we believe that it is not highly unreal-
istic. One way a cooperative may be taken over by a for-prot rm is a two stage
process. In the rst the cooperative is converted into a limited liability company
by giving the members equal (or pro rata) amounts of equity in the new company.
In the second stage, an outsider makes a tender o¤er for the shares of the former
cooperative. Our analysis would apply to the second stage of such a process.
3 CONCLUSION
We have shown that, under some assumptions, cooperatives are not vulnerable to
takeover by a raider who wishes to turn them into a prot-maximizing rm, except in
circumstances where the cooperative form is unlikely to be e¢ cient. In this conclusion
we argue that this analysis is more widely applicable since other market distortions
can be analysed in a similar way. We consider oligopolistic industries, distortions in
input markets and industries with externalities. Moreover the theory applies to a
wider range of rms than cooperatives such as partnerships or for-prot rms where
the shares are wholly or partly-owned by consumers or other trading partners.
3.1 Oligopolistic Markets
The analysis so far has considered a cooperative, which is the only producer in its
industry. If instead the industry is oligopolistic, there is a second e¤ect which also
acts to make takeovers di¢ cult. Reorganizing a cooperative as a for-prot rm will
change the objective function of the rm and this will in turn change the product
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market equilibrium. If rms compete Cournot-style, the changes are likely to be
unfavourable to the raider. Replacing a cooperative by a for-prot rm will cause
that rm to charge a higher price and produce a lower quantity for any given market
conditions. Rivals will respond by producing more output which will reduce the
prots of the rm. (Provided reaction curves are downward sloping, as is usual under
Cournot competition.) It is possible that this e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong for the
ex-post prot to be lower. For a more detailed discussion of the relation between
corporate governance and product market equilibrium see Kelsey and Milne (2008).9
3.2 Other Market Distortions
So far we have focused on imperfect competition in output markets. However the
analysis would also apply to some other market distortions. Similar arguments have
been advanced to show that industrial democracy can reduce the impact of asymmet-
ric information (Hansmann (1996)) and externalities (Kelsey and Milne (2006) and
Roemer (1993)). Consider a rm which produces an externality. Then starting at
the prot maximizing level, shareholders have an interest to reduce/increase a nega-
tive/positive externality since a change will have a second order e¤ect on prots but
the direct a¤ect on utility will be rst order.
Our theory can be modied to study a rm which provides an externality for
its owners. The variable di can be reinterpreted as as the net benet individual i
gets from a positive externality produced by the rm or the value to individual i of
controlling a negative externality. In our model the benets are received whether or
not the individual owns shares in the rm. This assumption is clearly valid for physical
externalities such as pollution. It is likely to hold for most pecuniary externalities
9Related results on strategic delegation in oligopolistic industries can be found in Fershtman and
Judd (1987) and Vickers (1985).
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between rms. It may or may not hold for other externalities.
3.3 Local Public Companies
In this section we argue that local public companies have many features in common
with cooperatives and review the empirical evidence. In both cases the organizational
form enables owner-shareholders to economize on monitoring costs, and/or other
market distortions.
Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009) (henceforth FMR) examine detailed data on the
evolution of ownership patterns of 60 U.K. rms over the twentieth century. In the
rst half of the century, legal investor protection was weak, yet the regional stock-
markets thrived. These markets traded local rms and their shares were held largely
by local shareholders. According to FMR informal mechanisms of trust were used
to inuence boards of local directors. They observe that even though there was
dispersion of ownership over time, local concentration of ownership continued to be
dominant. FMR argue that the evidence on takeovers shows that the same price was
o¤ered to all shareholders even in the absence of investor regulatory protection.
Later in the century, this local dominance declined as regional stock-markets were
replaced by the London market and institutional shareholders representing geograph-
ically dispersed shareholders became more important. Trust and local informal mech-
anisms were replaced by more formal legal mechanisms.
In the study by FMR, it would be instructive to see from U.K. data, if local public
companies attracted shareholders who faced pecuniary externalities that arose from
the actions of the rm, either as consumers of their output or suppliers of inputs.
These overlapping interests may have been formalized by mergers and takeovers so
that potential conicts could have been resolved. Over the twentieth century, as
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geographic dispersion of the rmsactivities grew by acquisitions and shareholders
became more geographically dispersed, this pecuniary e¤ect may have diminished.
During this time, due to a number of factors, mutual or cooperative rms became
less common. This could be explained by the same process of erosion in local trust
mechanisms for monitoring. An increase in regulatory protection reduced the need for
less formal systems of monitoring. Local pecuniary e¤ects were eroded by increased
competition and direct externalities were reduced due to dispersion and mobility of
rms and investors.
Another possible application would be to a conventional company created and
owned by a small number of businesses that are interested in purchasing its product.
This is similar to a local public company, since any externalities are conned to a
relatively small group of economic agents. If this similarity in product and input
market imperfections for cooperatives and corporations is important for governance
structures, then our argument for the stability of ownership, and internalization of
externalities, would operate for both cooperatives, locally owned public companies
and public companies with customer-supplier relationships.
A APPENDIX
This appendix contains the proofs of our main results.
A.1 Simultaneous Move Takeover Model
If q > 1; the raider can never make a positive prot, hence we may assume 1 > q >
0: Let L = fi; 0 + di 6 qg be the set of individuals whose total benet from the
cooperative is less than the raiders o¤er and let ` denote the number of individuals
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in this set. Of course L depends on the price q at which the raider o¤ers to buy the
shares. Let G = f1; :::;Mg nL denote the remaining individuals. Loosely speaking G
are the gainers and L are the losers from having production organized in a cooperative.
Lemma A.1 If m > `; then in any pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame fol-
lowing the raiders o¤er, precisely m 1 individuals accept. In particular all members
of L accept the o¤er.
Proof. First we shall check that such a prole is indeed an equilibrium. A member
who accepts the o¤er will get pay-o¤ q + di: This would fall to 0 + di if (s)he
rejected it. Now consider an individual, j; say who rejects the o¤er in this prole.
By construction j is not in L and hence 0 + dj > q: Moreover such an individual is
pivotal. By rejecting the o¤er j gets pay-o¤ 0 + dj: If instead j accepted the o¤er
his/her pay-o¤ would fall to q: This conrms that rejection is a best response. It
follows that this prole of strategies is indeed an equilibrium.
Now to demonstrate that there are no other pure strategy Nash equilibria. We
shall consider all other possible proles in turn and show that in each case at least
one individual has a protable deviation. First consider proles in which there are
r > m acceptances. In this case the raider will take control of the rm and raise the
share value to 1: Consider an individual who accepts the raiders o¤er. Currently
(s)he receives pay-o¤ q: If instead (s)he rejected the raiders o¤er, the bid would still
succeed. Hence his/her payo¤ would be 1 > q:10
Secondly consider the case where there are r = m acceptances. Sincem > `; there
exists an individual ~{ =2 L who accepts the raiders o¤er: Such an individual must be
pivotal. If instead (s)he rejected the raiders o¤er, as before, his/her pay-o¤ would
be 0 + di, which is greater than his/her current pay-o¤, q:
10Note such individuals are essentially using the free-riding strategy identied in Grossman and
Hart (1980).
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Thirdly consider a prole, in which there are r = m   1 acceptances and there
exists {^ 2 L; who does not accept the o¤er. Then {^s current payo¤ is 0 + d{^: This
would increase to q if instead {^ accepted the o¤er.
Finally consider a prole, in which there are r < m   1 acceptances. Consider
an individual, k; who currently is rejecting the raiders o¤er. If (s)he deviated and
accepted (s)he would receive q + dk > 0 + dk; which is his/her current pay-o¤.
Lemma A.2 If ` > m; then in any pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the subgame
following the raiders o¤er precisely m individuals accept. In particular all those who
accept are members of L.
Proof. First we shall check that a prole of this form is indeed an equilibrium. In
these proles the raider succeeds in taking over the rm and hence no private benets
will be received ex post. Thus an individual who rejects the o¤er will get pay-o¤ 1:
If instead (s)he accepted the o¤er his/her pay-o¤ would fall to q: All individuals who
accept the o¤er are pivotal and receive pay-o¤ q: If one of them deviated and rejected
the o¤er (s)he would receive 0 + di < q; since all individuals who accept the o¤er
are in L:
Now to demonstrate that there are no other pure strategy Nash equilibria. We
shall consider all other possible proles in turn and show that in each case at least
one individual has a protable deviation.
First consider proles in which there are r > m + 1 acceptances. In this case
the raider will take control of the rm, raise the share value to 1 and eliminate the
private benets. Consider an individual who accepts the raiders o¤er. Currently
(s)he receives pay-o¤ q: If instead (s)he rejected the raiders o¤er, the bid would still
succeed. Hence his/her payo¤ would be 1 > q:
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Secondly consider the case where there are r = m acceptances and there exists
an individual ~{ =2 L who accepts the raiders o¤er: Note that such an individual is
pivotal. If instead (s)he rejected the raiders o¤er as before his/her pay-o¤ would be
0 + di, which is greater than his/her current pay-o¤, q:
Thirdly consider a prole, in which there are r = m  1 acceptances. Since ` > m
there must exist an individual j 2 L who rejects the o¤er. If instead (s)he accepted
as before his/her pay-o¤ would be q, which is greater than his/her current pay-o¤,
0 + dj: Note that j must be pivotal.
Finally consider a prole in which there are r < m   1 acceptances. Let k be
an individual who rejects the raiders o¤er. He/she is not pivotal, so if instead (s)he
accepted the raiders o¤er, his/her pay-o¤would increase from 0+dk to q+dk: This
completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.1 Since individuals will not accept the o¤er unless it is
in their interest to do so, for the o¤er to succeed it is necessary that q be su¢ ciently
high that f1; :::;mg  L: (Recall L = fi : di 6 q   og :)
Suppose that 1   o < dm: To make a prot it is necessary that 1 > q: By
Lemma A.1, if the raider made an o¤er q such that q   o < dm she would not get
enough acceptances to gain control of the rm. Hence the raider would make a loss
of (m  1) (0   q) : It follows that making such an o¤er is not part of any subgame
perfect equilibrium.
Now suppose that 1   o > dm: If the raider o¤ers to buy the shares at price
q = o + dm then L = f1; :::;mg : (We assume that indi¤erence is resolved in favour
of the raider.) By Lemma A.2 precisely m individuals will accept the o¤er hence the
raider will gain control of the rm and make a prot of m (1   q) :
23
In the subgames described in Lemmas A.1 and A.2, there are multiple Nash
equilibria. As in other situations where equilibrium is not unique, this creates a
potential coordination problem, i.e. how do players know which of the possibly many
equilibrium strategies they should play? We believe the coordination problem here
is not as severe as it is in some other games because this game is not symmetric.
Hence there are many coordination devices which could be used to select a particular
Nash equilibrium. Consider, for instance, the case in Lemma A.2 where the takeover
succeeds. Then some but not all of the group of individuals who get low benet from
the cooperative vote for the takeover. Let L+ (resp. L ) denote those members of L
who vote for (resp. against) the takeover. The above proof shows that any situation
where m individuals are in L  is a Nash equilibrium. One of these in particular is
focal, where the m individuals with the lowest benets from the cooperative vote for
the takeover. (Recall this is a game of complete and perfect information so all players
know the pay-o¤s of the others.)
A.2 Sequential Takeover Model
This section of the appendix contains proofs of our claims about the sequential move
takeover model. For this section we do not make the assumption that d1 < d2 <
::: < dM ; since it is not without loss of generality in the sequential move game.
Recall we have dened L = fi; 0 + di 6 qg to be the set of individuals whose total
benet from the cooperative is less than the raiders o¤er and ` to denote the number
of individuals in this set. Let G = f1; :::;Mg nL denote the remaining individuals.
Loosely speaking G are the gainers and L are the losers from having production
organized in a cooperative. First we shall analyse the subgame following the raiders
o¤er.
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Lemma A.3 If m > ` then in the sub-game following the raiders o¤er a takeover
will not succeed. In particular all members of L will accept the o¤er and the rst
m   1   ` members of G will accept. The remaining members of G will reject the
o¤er.
Proof. We claim that the following set of strategies are a subgame perfect equilibrium
of the sub-game following the raiders o¤er.
 Members of L accept the raiders o¤er unless at least m+ 1  ` members of G
have already accepted.
 Members of G will accept the takeover bid if less than m  1  ` members of G
have accepted previously and will reject otherwise.
To check this constitutes a sub-game perfect equilibrium. First note that it is clear
no member of L will reject the o¤er on the equilibrium path. (Rejecting would reduce
the members own pay-o¤ and make the take-over less likely to happen.) Therefore
we shall not consider any history in which members of L reject the takeover.11
 To check members of L are playing best responses, consider a given individual,
 2 L: There are three sub-cases to consider depending on the history.
At mostm 1 `members of G have already accepted the raiders o¤er. In
this case, the o¤er will be rejected regardless of what  decides. Accepting
is a best response for  since it yields q + d > o + d; which is his/her
pay-o¤ if (s)he rejects.
11It might be in the interest of a member of L to reject the o¤er if su¢ ciently many members of G
had accepted to make the success of the takeover a certainty. However such a history can only arise
if there are multiple deviations from the equilibrium path. One can easily check that the proposed
subgame perfect equilibrium is robust to such deviations.
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Precisely m  ` members of G have already accepted the o¤er. In this case
 is pivotal, by accepting (s)he will obtain q > o + d.
At least m + 1  ` members of G have already accepted. In this case the
o¤er will succeed regardless of what  decides. Rejecting is a best response
for  in this case since it yields 1 + d > q + d; which is his/her pay-o¤
if (s)he accepts.
 To see that members of G are playing best responses, consider a given individ-
ual, g 2 G: There are three possible cases to consider:
 If if less than m   1   ` members of G have accepted previously then
the takeover will fail whatever g decides. By accepting g gets pay-o¤
q + dg > o + dg; which is his/her pay-o¤ if (s)he rejects.
 If precisely m   1   ` members of G have accepted previously then g is
pivotal. In equilibrium g will reject the o¤er after this history. This yields
g pay-o¤, o + dg > q; which is his/her pay-o¤ if (s)he accepts.
 If at least m  ` members of G have accepted previously then the takeover
will succeed regardless of what g does. In this case g by rejecting gets pay-
o¤ 1 > q; which is what (s)he would have received if (s)he had accepted.
Lemma A.4 If m 6 ` then in a subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential move
game, all members of G and the rst ` m members of L will reject the o¤er and the
remaining members of L will accept.
Proof. We claim,the following set of strategies constitute a subgame perfect equi-
librium:
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 Members of L reject the raiders o¤er if less than `   m members of L have
rejected previously and will accept otherwise.
 Members of G will reject the raiders o¤er unless ` m  1 members of L have
rejected previously in which case they accept.
To check this constitutes a sub-game perfect equilibrium. We shall not consider
histories where members of G accept the raiders o¤er. It is easy to show that such
individuals are not playing best responses.
 To check members of L are playing best responses, consider a given individual,
 2 L: There are three sub-cases to consider depending on the history.
At most `   m   1 members of L have previously rejected the raiders
o¤er. In this case if  rejects and all subsequent individuals follow the
equilibrium strategy then the take-over will succeed. By rejecting  raises
his/her pay-o¤ from q to 1:
Precisely ` m members of L have previously rejected the raiders o¤er. In
this case individual  is pivotal. By accepting (s)he raises his/her pay-o¤
from o + d to q:
At least ` m+1 members of L have previously rejected the raiders o¤er.
In this case the take-over will fail regardless of what  does. By accepting
 raises his/her pay-o¤ from o + d to q + d:
 To see that members ofG are playing best responses, consider a given individual,
g 2 G: There are three sub-cases to consider:
The takeover will succeed regardless of what g does. Rejecting the o¤er
raises gs pay-o¤ from q to 1.
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 Individual g is pivotal. Rejecting the o¤er raises gs pay-o¤ from q to
o + dg.
The takeover will fail regardless of what g does. Rejecting the o¤er will
lower gs pay-o¤ from q + dg to o + dg.
Proof of Proposition 2.3 For the o¤er to succeed it is necessary that q
be su¢ ciently high that jLj > m:12 Recall L = fi; 0 + di 6 qg denotes the set of
individuals whose total benet from the cooperative is less than the raiders o¤er.
Suppose that 1   o < dm: To make a prot it is necessary that 1 > q: By
Lemma A.3, if the raider made an o¤er q such that q   o < dm (s)he would not get
enough acceptances to gain control of the rm. Hence the raider would make a loss
of (m  1) (0   q) : It follows that making such an o¤er is not part of any subgame
perfect equilibrium.
Now suppose that 1   o > dm: If the raider o¤ers to buy the shares at price
q = o + dm then jLj = m: By Lemma A.4 precisely m individuals will accept the
o¤er hence the raider will gain control of the rm and make a prot of m (1   q) :
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